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executive head has ever been cited for contempt in such cir-
cumstances.'
Although the 1958 Congressional amendment to the "house-
keeping" statute" apparently intended to terminate the agen-
cies' power to withhold information from the public under
the authority of the statute," this aim has not yet reached
fulfillment. At least one federal case9 since the amendment
allowed a subordinate to withhold documents under an agency
regulation. Thus the rule of Boske v. Comingore appears to
continue untrammeled.
MIKLOS L. LONKAI
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-RULE 41(b)-DISMISSAL OF A
CAUSE OF ACTION WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR AT
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE--The plaintiff had gained an earlier
reversal from an order of a judgment on the pleadings,' in an
action arising out of an automobile-train collision. The case
was remanded after several interrogatories and two continu-
ances were granted, one for each party. These facts alone
made this the oldest civil case on the court's calendar. A pre-
trial conference was then set. The plaintiff's counsel attempt-
ed to obtain a rescheduling because he was out of town on a
matter before the state supreme court. Nevertheless, the
court exercised its inherent power of dismissal. The court felt
that the plaintiff's excuse. was not legitimate. On appeal the
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, held, one
justice dissenting, that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the case. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.,
291 F.2d 542 (1961).
A dismissal under rule 41(b), unless otherwise specified,
that the Attorney General is empowered to forbid his subordinates, though
within the court's jurisdiction, to produce documents and to hold later
that the Attorney General himself cannot in any event be procedurally
reached would be to apply a fox-hunting theory of justice that ought to
make Bentham's skeleton rattle."
16. But see in Sawyer v. Dollar, 190 F.2d 623 (D.C. Cir 1951) The
Secretary of Commerce, a party defendant, was held in contempt for refus-
ing to obey a court order directing him to endorse and deliver corporate
stock certificates held by him to certain parties adjudged to be the right-
ful owners. The Supreme Court subsequently vacated the judgment and
ordered the proceedings dismissed as moot.
17. Note 5 supra.
18. See Hearings on Availability of Information from Federal Depart-
ments and Agencies Before a Sub-committee of the House Committee on
Government Operations, 84th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 26 (1955): H.R. Rep.
1461, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1958); 104 Cong. Rec. 6551 (1958).
19. Hubbard v. Southern Railway Company, 179 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Ga.
1959).
1. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 237 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1956). ert. denied, 352
U.S. 1003 (1957).
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operates as an adjudication upon the merits' and raises the
bar of res judicata.' Dismissals, including a dismissal with
prejudice, being within the discretion of the court are rever-
sible only on abuse of discretion.' Therefore, the main point of
contention in the instant case is whether or not the court has
abused its judicial discretion in rendering a dismissal under
the rules.'
While it is difficult to define what is meant by abuse of
legal discretion, one of its essential attributes is that it must
plainly appear to effect injustice.' Although the expedition of
business and the full utilization of the court's time are highly
desirable, the duty of administering justice in each individual
case must not be lost sight of as the paramount objective.'
Just as a matter of sound public policy, litigation should be
disposed of upon substantial rather than technical grounds.
While many cases can be found which justify a dismissal as
a matter of sound judicial discretion, they are cases in which
plaintiff's, or his counsel's, actions were willful and unjusti-
fied,' injurious and prejudicial,"0 wanton and dilatory,1 or de-
2. Bowles v. Biberman Bros., 152 F.2d 700 (3rd Cir. 1945), rev'd. 61 F.
Supp. 614 (E.D. Pa. 1945); American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,
142 F.2d 571 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Rules F.C.A. 446.
3. Olsen v. Muskegon Piston Ring Co., 117 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1941; cf.,
Tulsa v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 75 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1935), cert.
denied, 295 U.S. 744 (1935); Mitchell v. David, 52 A.2d 125 (D.D.C. 1947); see
generally, 149 A.L.R. 553.
4. Peardon v. Chapman, 169 F.2d 909 (3rd Cir. 1948); see generally, 17
Am. Jur. Dismissal. § 119 et seq.
5. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16; In any action, the court may in its discretion
direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference....
(Authorizes pre-trial conferences).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 (b); for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or
to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move
for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff
has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without
waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted,
may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right of relief. In an action tried by the court
without a jury the court as trier of the facts may then determine them
and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judg-
ment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as
provided in rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order of dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not pro-
vided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or
for improper venue, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 83; Each district court by action of a majority of the
judges thereof may from time to time make and amend rules governing its
practice not inconsistent with these rules. . . . (Rules have the force of
law. Well v. Neary, 278 U.S. 160, 169 (1929).
6. Jepson v. Sherry, 99 Cal. App. 2d 119, 220 P.2d 822 (The discretion
to be exercised Is one controlled by legal principles and is to be exercised
in accordance with the spirit of the law with a view to serving justice).
7. Allegro v. Afton Village Corp., 9 N.J. 156, 87 A.2d 430 (1952).
.8. Ordway v. Arata, 150 Cal. App. 2d 71, 309 P.2d 919 (1957).
9. First Hydro Electric Co-op v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co., 245
F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871 (1957).
10. Refior v. Lansing Drop Forge Co., 124 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 671 (1942); Hicks v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 115
F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1940).
11. See Dalrymple v. Pittsburgh Consolidated Coal Co., 24 F.R.D. 260
(W.D. Pa. 1959); (The congestion of a court's calendar seems to greatly
influence the exercising of a court's judicial discretion. This factor makes
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liberate and contumacious," such as to interfere with due ad-
ministration of justice." None of these grounds were present
in the instant case and in fact counsel manifested his good
faith by attempting to reschedule the hearing. However, there
are cases which, while distinguishable, have held reversals for
abuse of discretion under situations analogous to the instant
case." Where a reasonable excuse is offered for failure to
comply with a rule or an order the court should, in the exer-
cise of its discretion, either refuse to dismiss or provide in its
order of dismissal that it does not constitute an adjudication
upon its merits. 5
Only one case was discernable that could support the hold-
ing in the instant case,"6 but it can be distinguished in that no
attempt of rescheduling was made. Therefore, the implication
of the instant case is that a court has a pre-emptive right to
arbitrarily dismiss merely for non-appearance at a pre-trial
conference. This gives rule 41 (b) a mandatory rather than a
permissive construction contrary to its specific language."
In the instant case the defendant would have suffered no
loss by a further short adjournment as the delay would not
have been injurious or legally prejudicial to the defendant,
which should be prerequisite to invoking the drastic sanction
of a dismissal with prejudice." A defendant might also be
estopped from claiming injury if he consents to a continu-
ance."
a dismissal under these facts very arbitrary, rather than judicial.) See also,
44 A.B.A.J. 552, wherein a statistical analysis of federal district court
calendars shows that at the time of the Dalyrmple case the median time
from filing to disposition was 34 months).
12. See Jameson v. DuComb, 275 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1960); ef. Joseph v.
Norton Co., 24 F.R.D. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), affirmed, 273 F.2d 65 (2nd Cir.
1959).
13. See Barger v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 130 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
14. Peardon v. Chapman, 169 F.2d 909 (3rd Cir. 1948), (Other trial work
and illness of counsel held excusable); Maresco v. Lambert, 2 F.R.D. 163
(N.Y.-1941), (Failure to comply with court order held excused); Brown v.
Haymore, 43 Ariz. 466, 32 P.2d 1027 (1934), (Plaintiff not personally notified
of setting); Craft v. Cannon, 58 Ariz. 457, 121 P.2d 421 (1942), (Reversed
for lack of want of diligence); Eaton v. Harrison, 100 Fla. 1668, 132 So.
635 (1931), (No want of diligence found(; Allegro v. Afton Village Corp., 9
N.J. 156, 87 A.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1952), (No injury suffered by defendant);
Cambridge State Bank v. Nyberg, 72 N.W.2d 345 (Minn. 1955), (Failure
to appear at preliminary call of calendar excused); Shaw v. Universal Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 123 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. 1938), (Punishment personal to
counsel available, client should not suffer from negligence of attorney).
15. Producer's Releasing Corp, de Cuba v. P.R.C. Pictures, 176 A.2d 93
(2nd Cir. 1949). See also, 5 Moore's Fed. Prac. 1040. (This statement seems
to weaken the court's construction of authority if the word "reasonable"
were to be construed in its legal sense).
16. Wisdom v. Texas Co., 27 F. Supp. 922 (N.D. Ala. 1939). (The court
In the instant case cites Moore's Fed. Prac. to the effect that the Wisdom
dismissal was for the disobedience of a court order, but although this is
the issue squarely before this court It was not adjudicated or even men-
tioned In dictum in the Wisdom case).
17. See rule 41(b), supra n'ote 5.
18. Refior v. Lansing Drop Forge Co., 124 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 671 (1942).
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While a litigant is generally bound by the action or inac-
tion of his counsel, there is authority for the proposition that
When a plaintiff places his case in the hands of reputable
counsel he should not be turned out of court if the action com-
plained of was almost entirely on account of neglect or over-
sight of his counsel.' This presents another ramification of
rule 41 (b) that should be noted in that it has serious impli-
cations for the attorney as well as the client. An attorney is
liable to the client for his ignorance or non-observance of the
rules of the court in which he practices' and the client who
has suffered by this negligence may recover therefor in an
action at law.2"
Rule 41 (b) has directly reversed equity's traditional doc-
trine that a dismissal without consideration of the merits is
also without prejudice to the complainant.' However, the
spirit of the rule is equitable in nature and the court in its
application may preserve this by specifying in its order that
the dismissal is without prejudice.' Nevertheless, the rule as
now written allows a court this discretion whereby, through
oversight, innocent mistake, or for other reasons, a highly
prejudicial result may be reached. As a solution, this writer
advocates the amendment of rule 41(b) of both the Federal
and North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. The form of the
amendment could follow that of a proposed, but yet unadopt-
ed, amendment made in 1955,' which was somewhat parallel
in that it would have made a dismissal for "lack of an indis-
pensable party" similarly without prejudice. This would re-
solve undue hardships and unnecessary litigation exposed by
the rule as now written and would restore the guarantees of
the law that litigation will be adjudicated upon its merits. It
is to be noted that this writer realizes that there are instances
where an attorney's actions are contumacious or flagrantly
disobedient in nature, however, the court is not without re-
19. Grass v. Rindge Co., 84 Cal. App. 750 258 Pac. 673 (1927).
20. Manson v. First Nat. Bank of Indiana, 366 Pa. 293, 77 A.2d 399 (1951).
21. Citizens Loan Fund & Savings Assn. v. Friedly, 123 Ind. 143, 23 N.E.
1075 (1900), See generally, 5 Am. Jur., Attorney and Client, § 128.
22. Weekly v. Knight, 116 Fla. 721, 156 So. 625 (1934).
23. Peardon v. Chapman, 169 F.2d 909 (3rd Cir. 1948).
24. See, rule 41(b), supra note 5.
25. MOORE'S FED. PRAC. 648 (1961 Supp.); 1 MOORE'S FED. PRAC.
5301 et seq. (The Original Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Pro-
cedure, which proposed this amendment consisted of 50% of the original
draftors of the Fed. R. Civ. P. The Committee felt that their proposal would
remedy the situation where the court did not specifically provide that the
dismissal was without prejudice; and thus expressly provide a result which
the courts, of necessity, would have to reach even if the dismissal did not
specify that it was without prejudice. That proposition coincides precisely
with the problem at hand).
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course since the attorney is an officer of the court and other
personal sanctions are available against him. Also, if the sta-
tute of limitations has run on the action and the counsel's neg-
ligence results in the dismissal, with or without prejudice, the
client may sue the attorney as pointed out earlier.:
RONALD G. SCHMIDT
HOMICIDE-MANSLAUGHTER-CASUAL CONNECTION BETWEEN
ACT AND DEATH UNDER MISDEMEANOR-MANSLAUGHTER RULE--
The defendant gave the keys of his automobile to an intoxi-
cated person who, while driving the car, became involved in
a collision with another car, killing both drivers. Defendant
was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Michigan held, the defendant was not guilty
of the crime charged because the death was not counselled by
him, nor accomplished by another acting jointly with him, nor
did it occur in the attempted achievement of some common
enterprise. He was, however, found guilty of a misdemeanor
for allowing an intoxicated person to drive his car.' People
v. Marshall, 106 N.W. 2d 842 (Mich. 1961).
The courts have been concerned with the applicability of
the misdemeanor rule in two types of cases; those in which
the defendant participates in the act causing death and those
in which he is not present when the death occurs.
Illustrative of the former is Story v. United States' on
which the prosecution relied. This case was one of direct par-
ticipation for the defendant was a passenger in his own car
and permitted an intoxicated person to drive. A pedestrian
was killed and a conviction of manslaughter was upheld. Be-
cause of his degree of participation, the defendant in Ex
Parte Liotard' was convicted on substantially the same rea-
soning. Further exemplification of conviction where the de-
fendant participated in the very act which resulted in death
is State v. Hopkins.! In that case the defendant was convict-
ed of the offence for aiding and abetting its commission.
Similarly, the courts find no difficulty in convicting a de-
fendant on the rationale of the misdemeanor-manslaughter
rule in cases where someone is killed while the defendant is
26. See, supra note 22.
1. Mich. Comp. Laws § 625(b).
2. Story v. United States, 16 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
3. Ex Parte Liotard, 47, Nev. 169, 217 Pac. 960 (1923) (Riding on run-
ning board).
4. State v. Hopkins, 147 Wash. 198, 265 Pac. 481 (1928).
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